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Abstract 
 
What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies?  
Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets 
interact.  In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive 
important changes in the allocation of state largess.  When governing parties are 
centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to 
particularly influential regions and industries.  By contrast, when governing parties are 
decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents, 
allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll.  I find evidence for these 
relationships by comparing India’s distribution process for industrial licenses and 
government finance under a decentralized Congress Party (1954-61) to its distribution 
process under a centralized Congress Party (1969-75).   
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 What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage and support 
in democracies?  In other words, how do we understand which actors benefit from 
government largess and which are left in the cold?  Answering this question is vital to 
improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact around the world.  Many 
governments intervene heavily in their national economies, making economic patronage 
(including such instruments as trade protection, subsidies, government loans, and 
industrial licenses) an important driver of outcomes.  As scholars of the developmental 
state have shown, governments can spur rapid growth through the (economically) 
efficient application of support.1  In most countries, however, the allocation of economic 
benefits tends to follow a political rather than an economic logic.2   
 Scholars have advanced a variety of explanations in their efforts to understand 
who gets what.  Some have suggested that government generosity depends simply on the 
influence of the potential recipient.  Researchers have proposed, for example, that more 
geographically concentrated industries are more likely to receive trade protection.3  
Alternatively, some have suggested that industries dominated by a small number of firms 
are more effective at soliciting the state than are highly decentralized industries.4  Other 
political scientists have highlighted the role played by domestic institutional variation in 
aggregating and mediating the demands of aspiring government clients.  There is, for 
example, evidence that such factors as the structure of electoral systems and the 
relationship between executives and legislatures influence the allocation of economic 
patronage.5    
Despite these important advances, the literature has largely overlooked one 
institution that may profoundly influence the distribution of government benefits – the 
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political party.  While prior studies have examined the impact of party ideology and party 
system on various types of patronage distribution, party organization has mostly fallen by 
the scholarly wayside.6  In this article, I hope to help remedy that problem by examining 
how changing party centralization drove important changes in the allocation of economic 
patronage in India.7 
My understanding of party centralization, the component of party organization 
that I examine here, takes its cue from the literature on the organizational characteristics 
of parties.8  In systems with centralized parties, decision-making is primarily in the hands 
of national party leaders.  These leaders may head the party organization, hold key 
positions in government, or both.  Whatever the case, they exercise significant power 
over the party apparatus and the party’s elected deputies.  Often, the source of this power 
is their control over the party name in legislative elections, but other means of leverage 
are also possible.   
When centralized parties hold the reigns of power, national party leaders will 
make the decisions as to which groups receive economic patronage and at what level.9  
These national leaders will be in a position to assess how patronage can best be targeted 
to achieve their party’s national political goals. As a result, they will distribute economic 
benefits to particularly influential and strategic regions and firms.  National party leaders 
might, for example, target patronage to contested constituencies to firm up their local 
support.  Sub-national party officials will probably continue to advocate to the party 
leadership for patronage in their constituencies, but only those from the more electorally 
strategic locales will succeed.  Likewise, potential clients in the private sector will 
continue to lobby for state aid, but only the more organized and well financed are likely 
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to achieve their aims.  In systems with centralized parties, therefore, economic patronage 
will generally be concentrated in the most influential and strategic industries and regions. 
 When governing parties are decentralized, numerous sub-national party officials 
will have influence over national policy.  These officials, by virtue of their smaller 
constituencies, will be easier targets for lobbyists than their colleagues running the 
national party.  As a result, in systems with decentralized parties, patronage will arise 
from numerous, independently powerful sub-national officials and party leaders 
advocating for industries in their constituencies.  This advocacy will generally take the 
form of a logroll, with many influential party officials, each associated with particular 
clients and constituencies, trading support.   
The decentralized nature of the governing party or parties can manifest itself in a 
wide variety of ways, depending on the economic policy process of the individual 
country.  For example, lobbying and logrolls may take place either in party organizations 
or in party-dominated legislatures, governments, or bureaucracies. They may be 
characterized by classic legislative vote trading, a debate among representatives to a party 
organizational meeting, or bargaining among co-partisan national and regional officials.  
We can be sure, however, that independently powerful local and regional officials will 
demand a role in allocating benefits.   
This patronage will tend to be distributed rather evenly among a democracy’s sub-
national units and firms.  The independent power of sub-national officials and 
representatives in decentralized parties, along with the logrolling process, will ensure that 
few geographical areas are left without support.  Indeed, the relatively even spread of 
patronage will extend to the smallest geographical or industrial unit that is represented in 
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the decentralized policy-making process.  Of course, even in a system with decentralized 
parties, more strategic regions and firms may be in a better position to demand benefits.  
Still, when decentralized parties are in power, I suggest, the distribution of economic 
support will be more even than when centralized parties control the government. 
I evaluate these arguments with a comparison of India’s experience across two 
historical periods in which the centralization of the country’s chief political party, the 
Indian National Congress (hereafter the Congress Party or simply the Congress), has 
varied.  The first period that I examine stretches from 1954 to 1961, and encompasses the 
development and execution of the Second Five Year Plan under Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
decentralized Congress.  The second period, extending from 1969 to 1975, saw the 
consolidation of power by Indira Gandhi, her centralization of the Congress Party, and a 
strengthening of the government’s role in economic affairs.  I use the analysis to evaluate 
party centralization and economic patronage distribution in each period and to assess the 
causal mechanisms, if any, that have linked the variables together.   
My analysis is cross-temporally rather than cross-sectionally comparative and 
makes use of a most-similar-systems research design.10  This approach allows me to vary 
party centralization while controlling for potentially confounding factors more effectively 
than would a cross-national comparison.  India in 1954 and India in 1969, while certainly 
different, are probably more comparable in most ways than, for example, India in 1969 
and Nigeria in 1969.  India continued to operate under the same constitution across the 
two periods, and such formal institutions as the country’s electoral system and the 
relationship between its legislature and executive changed little.  Further, the Indian 
National Congress held tightly to the reigns of power during both periods, resulting in 
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little significant change to India’s party system or to its professed governing ideology.11  
What did change was the organization of the Congress Party, which centralized 
significantly during the second period.  India is therefore an excellent laboratory for 
evaluating the effects of party centralization on patronage distribution in a temporally 
comparative setting.  As most potentially confounding factors are constant across the two 
periods, I am able to test the “sufficiency” (although not the “necessity”) of relative party 
centralization as an explanation for changes in patronage distribution. 
 
 
Decentralized Distribution: 1954 – 61 
In the years following India’s independence in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru’s power 
base, the Congress Party, transformed itself from a nationalist movement into an 
encompassing political party.  The Congress Party of the 1950s and early 1960s featured 
a decentralized structure in which the preferences of local and state officials were 
aggregated into government policy.  At the same time, India’s Second Five Year Plan 
launched the country on an economic development path based on import substitution and 
government direction.   While India’s decision to adopt this development path sprang 
primarily from the beliefs of its early leaders, party organization played a critical role in 
how the strategy was implemented.  This section will argue that the decentralized nature 
of the Congress Party led to fierce bargaining among influential state and local leaders 
over the allocation of economic benefits under the Second Five Year Plan.  The 
distribution of these benefits was determined through a vast national logroll, leading, I 
contend, to an even distribution of industrial licensing and state finance relative to what 
would come later.  Thus, I argue that the Congress Party’s decentralized structure was a 
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key determinant of the distribution of state-funded economic benefits in post-
independence India.  
 
 
The Independent Variable:  
The Decentralized Indian National Congress 
 
 
 During the 1950s, the Congress Party sprawled across India’s political scene, 
aggregating the views of local and state elites from Punjab to Madras and providing the 
country with direction and stability.  The party’s decentralization was reflected in, among 
other things, the formal party organization.  On paper and to a significant extent in 
reality, the Congress was a bottom-up organization.12  At the base of the party were the 
Mandal Congress Committees (MCCs), largely chosen by the party’s primary members 
and responsible for a population of at most 20,000 people.  The MCCs played a key role 
in electing the party’s next highest unit, the District Congress Committees (DCCs), which 
in turn helped select members of the state-level Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs).  
Members of India’s PCCs then elected the president of the party and chose one-eighth of 
their number to constitute the national All India Congress Committee (AICC).  Finally, 
the AICC and the Congress president selected the membership of the party’s most 
powerful body, the Congress Working Committee (CWC). 
Under Nehru, this organizational structure had real weight, and the national party 
leadership, while firmly in control, based its power in the consent of the party’s local and 
state units.13  As Weiner famously pointed out in his grassroots study of the party, 
Congress dominance was founded not on mobilization but on mediation and broad-based 
aggregation.14  The decentralized party structure was a conduit for passing the 
 9
preferences of sub-national elites and, to a lesser extent, the rank-and-file up to the PCCs 
and the CWC.15   
 The Congress’s decentralized structure was also visible in its candidate 
nomination procedures.16  When the party sought potential candidates for state and 
national elections, it first solicited the views of the Mandal and District Congress 
Committees.  The state-level Pradesh Congress Committee (or the Pradesh Election 
Committee) might, for example, send representatives to constituencies to interview 
potential candidates and to speak with MCC and DCC members.  Determining the 
competitiveness of a potential candidate required a detailed knowledge of factional, caste, 
and religious divisions within a constituency, something that could not be evaluated from 
New Delhi or even from state capitals. 
The views of the Mandal and District party leadership generally weighed heavily 
on the decision at the state level.  After considering carefully the views of these local 
party leaders, the PCC would make candidate recommendations to the Central Election 
Committee (CEC).  The CEC, drawn from the Congress Working Committee, would then 
consider the recommendations and produce the final list of candidates. 
In states with fairly stable Congress governments, the CEC generally left the 
nomination decision at the Pradesh level.17  When state parties were particularly faction-
ridden and unstable, the CEC would involve itself more deeply in the nomination 
procedure.  Even then, however, it was a mediator or arbitrator among competing state 
factions, not a central organization imposing its will on subordinates.   
Clearly, then, the Congress Party under Nehru was a broadly decentralized 
organization.  Sub-national elites maintained independent power bases in party factions, 
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loyal electoral support, local governing councils, and state ministries.  Their preferences 
were aggregated up through the party apparatus, and the central leadership provided 
broad policy guidance while acting as a mediator of local and state interests.  
 
Examining the Causal Linkages: 
Did Party Decentralization Drive Economic Patronage Distribution? 
 
 Proper functioning of the Second Five Year Plan required significant government 
intervention in the Indian economy, with the state taking responsibility for regulating 
production (through industrial licenses) and providing finance (through subsidized loans 
and grants).  The Congress Party’s decentralized structure played a vital role in 
determining the administrative processes through which the Indian government allocated 
these economic benefits. 
    
Highlighting Causality:  
Party Decentralization and Financial Disbursements  
 
 One of the most important goals of the Second Five Year Plan was to drive 
development in India through massive investment, much of which was earmarked to 
establish or grow protected enterprises.  Decisions about which regions and industries 
would receive the all-important government rupees were the product of a complex, multi-
level process.   
 At the center of this process was the Planning Commission, formed in 1950 and 
charged with drawing up the planning documents and overseeing their implementation.  
The presence of the prime minister and several key cabinet ministers on the Planning 
Commission aimed to ensure that the ambitious national plans would not be ignored.18   
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Helping to guide the actions of the Planning Commission was the National 
Development Council (NDC), created in 1952 to represent formally the views of India’s 
state governments.  The NDC comprised the members of the Planning Commission as 
well as each of India’s chief ministers, the heads of government in India’s federal states.  
The cabinet resolution creating the NDC gave the body such a key role that planning 
scholar A. H. Hanson has called it, “an advisory body which could be said to rival the 
Planning Commission itself in importance.”19  The NDC served as a forum through 
which powerful sub-national elites could influence the plan and push for increased 
government outlays to their states.20   
 The formulation of the Second Plan began as early as 1954, more than two years 
before its final adoption.  During these early stages, a series of debates were held within 
the Planning Commission, the cabinet, and the NDC to develop the broad outline of the 
plan.  At the same time, state, district, and even village governments were in the process 
of formulating their own plans to be incorporated into the national document.21  Indeed, 
the planning process in India, while coordinated at the national level, was carried out, to 
one degree or another, in cities and villages across the country.  While some local plans 
were in fact developed by state officials to satisfy New Delhi’s demands for grass roots 
involvement, village and district officials often pressured state officials to advocate 
projects in their constituencies to the Planning Commission.22   
 As the village and district plans were being developed, the states were working to 
formulate their own plans.  Caught between the plan guidelines developed in New Delhi 
and the demands of village and district authorities and interest groups, their task was not 
a trivial one.  The development of state plans and the incorporation of village and district 
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plans generally involved a process of lobbying by various powerful interests and 
logrolling among state ministries.23  Local elites and demand groups with influence over 
state plans traded favors, producing documents full of requests for finance from the 
central government.  In the state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, a consultative Advisory 
Board raised the suggested total money to be spent under the plan from Rs.475 crores to 
Rs.482 crores.24   
In July 1955, the Planning Commission and the NDC began to consider how the 
state plans would be incorporated into the national effort.  Thus began a round of 
logrolling and negotiation among the state chief ministers, each advocating for the 
expansion of protected industries and the provision of finance to his state.25  NDC 
meetings were often characterized by vote trading over disbursements under the plan, 
creating logrolls among the powerful state politicians.26  Indeed, as a result of these 
logrolls, the finance minister called into question the fiscal solvency of the plan in the 
NDC.  No doubt in a centralized system the financial allocations incorporated into the 
plan would have been reduced, but in India’s decentralized system the chief ministers 
would have none of it.  They blocked the efforts of the finance minister and the Planning 
Commission to cut financial outlays under the plan, and at the same time initially refused 
to increase taxes.27   
 While the NDC was working to revise the state and national plans, the powerful 
Congress Party organization was holding its own discussions.  On August 14, 1955, the 
president of the All-India Congress Committee issued a circular to prepare members for a 
wide-ranging discussion of the plan: 
You perhaps know that the Plan Frame and the question of resources were 
discussed by the Standing Committee of the National Development Council on 
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which are represented some of the Chief Ministers who are also in their political 
capacity our leaders. . . .  Our leaders in the government are in a better position to 
study these questions. . . .  Apart from this, I would not set any limit to 
constructive suggestions. . . .  Nor would I like to set any limit to suggestions for 
the more efficient and economical implementation of the Second Five Year 
Plan.28 
 
While the party’s organizational leadership showed a willingness to defer somewhat to 
their colleagues in the government, they were still determined to have their say.  
Members of the party’s influential governing body brought with them concerns about 
how the plan would influence their home villages, cities, and states.  These views would 
have been aggregated up to the party leadership that controlled the future of the plan. 
 After seven months of discussions, the NDC approved the Draft Outline of the 
Second Plan, and it was published by the Commission.  The Draft Outline contained the 
Planning Commission’s first official recommendations for the general shape of financial 
allocations under the plan.  Its release began an even broader national debate over the 
details of the plan, a debate carried out in the NDC, the cabinet, the parliament, the 
Congress Party, and numerous less official forums.  In its explanation of the planning 
process, the Commission put it this way: 
With the approval of the [National Development] Council, the Draft Outline is 
published as a document for the widest public discussion and consideration.  
Comments are invited from all sections of opinion.  State governments arrange for 
the Draft Outline to be discussed at the district level by District Development 
Councils and other bodies.29 
  
The central and state governments consulted again with influential local elites and 
pressure groups, absorbing their views for the final session of logrolling before the 
publication of the plan document.   
The national parliament also debated the Draft Outline.  As the Planning 
Commission put it: 
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 . . . at the national level, both Houses of Parliament arrange for discussion of the 
Draft Outline, first in a general way for a few days at a time, and then in greater 
detail through a series of Parliamentary Committees which individual Members 
are free to join . . . .30 
 
The Draft Outline of the Second Plan elicited significant interest among the MPs, leading 
to additional demands for changes.  Member comments ranged from questions about the 
broad structure of the plan to concerns over its effects in their constituencies.31 
 Taking all these views into consideration, the Planning Commission, still working 
in consultation with state chief ministers on the NDC, produced the final plan document.  
This document represented, at least to some extent, a national consensus over the 
distribution of government support under the plan.  Even this “final” document was not, 
however, final in any true sense, but was subjected to constant review and criticism over 
the plan’s five years.  The Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament, debated it 
several times, and the NDC considered proposed changes, including a dramatic increase 
in agricultural production targets.  Indeed, the Planning Commission caved to pressure 
groups by increasing plan outlays to a number of economic sectors.32  Even a foreign 
exchange crunch in 1957 was not enough to reduce expenditures under the plan by more 
than Rs. 200 crores.33 
 The decentralized process of formulating and implementing the Second Five Year 
Plan afforded central ministries, state governments, the Congress Party, the parliament, 
local elites, and private interests ample opportunities to influence investment targets.  
Indeed, the nature of the process accords well with the expectations of the theory.  The 
development of the plan was characterized by constant lobbying from a multitude of 
independently powerful actors, each attempting to ensure that the plan would be as 
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beneficial as possible to its interests.  As we have seen, a series of logrolls took place 
simultaneously at the district, state, and national levels.   
How do we know that this decentralized process reflected a decentralized 
Congress Party?  My argument does not require that the financial allocation process 
should be carried out within the political party organization itself.  Indeed, while the 
Congress Party organization played an important role in the development of the plan, 
much of the process took place in the institutions of government.  Nevertheless, as these 
institutions were dominated by members of the Congress, the structure of the party was 
vital to the policy making process.  Kothari, for example, has linked the development of 
mediating institutions in the party organization with the development of similar 
institutions in the state apparatus.34 
Even if the administrative process had been centralized on paper, without the 
NDC and lacking state and local planning, a decentralized Congress would have ensured 
a decentralized plan.  When local and state Congress members have independent power 
bases, they demand a role in the process, whether formal or informal.  On the other hand, 
in the presence of a centralized Congress, even an administrative process that was 
decentralized on paper would be centrally controlled in reality.  District Development 
Councils, state advisory bodies, Congress committees, and even the NDC would be 
unable to influence the plan if their members were under the thumb of the party 
leadership.  We shall see the truth of this statement in the next section, which examines 
the government of Indira Gandhi. 
Because of the Planning Commission’s obligation to respond to independently 
powerful elites and interest groups, financial disbursements under the Second Plan were 
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distributed relatively evenly by region.  It should be emphasized that these disbursements 
were sometimes not very balanced in absolute terms, but were balanced relative to 
allocations under the centralized system of Indira Gandhi.  In the next section, I will 
present some basic statistics comparing the geographical distribution of government 
finance under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi.   
 
Highlighting Causality:  
Party Decentralization and the Allocation of Industrial Licenses 
 
Government financial outlays were not the only policy instrument of planning 
affected by the decentralization of Congress.  The process of allocating industrial 
licenses, of vital importance in planned economies, also reflected the decentralized 
structure of the party.  Through the potent mechanism of licensing, government officials 
ensured that private firms operated only in those industries reserved for them and that the 
country’s scarce resources were devoted to areas prioritized by the plan.  Licensing was 
also intended to encourage smaller industries, prevent the concentration of ownership, 
promote regionally balanced economic development, and ensure the usage of 
domestically produced inputs.35 
 At the center of the industrial licensing process was the inter-ministerial 
Licensing Committee.  Generally, license applications were first reviewed by relevant 
government ministries, which then forwarded those they supported to the committee.  
After receiving advice from the Directorate General of Technical Development, the 
Licensing Committee made recommendations to the Minister for Industrial Development, 
who then made the final decisions.  Often, additional committees and government 
agencies were involved in the review process.36 
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 Given the prominent role played by various government ministries, the licensing 
process was both decentralized and political from the start.  A number of observers, 
including the authors of an official Lok Sabha study, have noted the lack of economic 
guidelines to inform the decisions of the committee.37  As a result, political pressures 
played a significant role in determining who was granted a license and who was not.  The 
same Lok Sabha study noted that: 
It has been stated by the official representative of the Ministry that ‘Quite a 
number of States keep on representing that their areas have not received an 
adequate share of licenses.  I have not got the figures for the number of 
representations, but it is a fact that from time to time, Chief Ministers of States 
and Industries Ministers of States do write to us pointing out that their States, in 
their opinion, have not received a fair share of the licenses.’38 
 
The ministry representative went on the say that the government gave preference to 
projects located in underdeveloped areas, but that economic factors were considered first.  
A representative from the Planning Commission concurred with this view, but noted that 
“there may be other elements like regional considerations which may have to be 
introduced in the consideration of particular projects.”39   
This anecdote indicates that state officials were not afraid to advocate for the 
licensing of projects in their constituencies.  Influential businesses also appear to have 
applied political pressure to influence the industrial licensing process.  Government 
ministries often developed clients among interest groups and lobbyists, and very likely 
advocated for firms under their purview when referring their applications to the Licensing 
Committee.40 
 The industrial licensing process under Nehru thus accords well with the 
expectations of the theory.  It was decentralized, and was characterized by powerful state 
officials pressuring the central government to grant as many licenses as possible for firms 
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and projects in their constituencies.  The decentralized structure of the Congress Party, to 
which both the central and state leadership almost invariably belonged, ensured that these 
requests were often heeded.  As a result, while industrial licenses were not distributed 
evenly across regions in an absolute sense, they were (as we shall see in the next section) 
allocated with more balance under Nehru than under Indira Gandhi. 
 
Centralization and Patronage:  1969 – 1975 
 Although Indira Gandhi first became India’s prime minister in 1966, it was not 
until after the bitter 1969 split in the Congress that she put her indelible mark on the party 
and on the nation it represented.  She centralized the Congress Party under her direct 
control, dispensing with intra-party elections and creating a top-down chain of command.   
Moreover, she accelerated the collapse of the Congress System that had aggregated the 
preferences of sub-state elites under her father.  Gandhi based her support primarily on 
populist appeals, and after the 1969 split, she lost control of a large portion of the party 
organization.   
 At the same time, Prime Minister Gandhi set her country on a road towards 
increased government regulation and expanded economic subsidies.41  I argue in this 
section that, in keeping with the theory’s expectations, these economic benefits were 
distributed by national party leaders and indeed by Gandhi herself.  Gone were the days 
of independently powerful party officials distributing economic benefits through a 
national logroll.  Under Indira Gandhi, it was the prime minister and her immediate 
associates who controlled the patronage of the state, distributing it strategically and 
unevenly to encourage support and to punish opposition. 
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The Independent Variable: 
Centralization of the Indian National Congress 
 
 While Prime Minister Gandhi made some efforts to centralize power before the 
famous Congress split, it was only after she had broken with the party’s entrenched 
bosses that she could truly dominate the party apparatus.  In 1969, a brewing dispute 
between Gandhi and the party’s organizational leadership, often termed the Syndicate, 
came to a head over the election of the Indian President.  After trading a series of 
recriminations with members of the Syndicate, the prime minister and her supporters in 
parliament separated from the party’s organizational leaders and claimed the mantle of 
the Congress for themselves.  From 1969, power in Indira Gandhi’s Congress, termed the 
Congress (R) and later the Congress (I), was concentrated in her hands and in the hands 
of her closest associates.42  This centralization of control was further expanded after the 
prime minister’s triumphant 1971 election victory, in which she secured fully 67.9% of 
seats in the Lok Sabha, performing significantly better than had the united Congress in 
1967.43  By contrast, the branch of the Congress dominated by the Syndicate, the 
Congress (O), performed quite poorly.  No longer dependent on the communists, the 
Syndicate, or the Congress left-wing for her position, Indira Gandhi exercised a level of 
power that her father never could have imagined. 
 No doubt thinking of her recent confrontation with the Syndicate, Gandhi moved 
quickly after the split to establish her control over the Congress (R).44  Never again would 
the prime minister allow herself to be challenged by independently powerful party leaders 
at the apex of the Congress.  To that end, she ensured that all Congress presidents would 
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be close associates and unlikely to criticize her openly.  Indeed, after her strength was 
reinforced by the successful 1971 elections, Gandhi made sure that holders of that high 
office would have no political base and would be totally dependent on her largess.  
Further, to prevent any future Congress president from transforming the position into a 
source of independent power, Prime Minister Gandhi ensured that no one would hold the 
office for long.  Five different individuals held the presidency between 1969 and 1975.45  
In 1972, the prime minister pushed one of her closest associates, Jagjivan Ram, out of the 
Congress presidency and replaced him with D. Sanjivayya, a party leader with no 
independent base.  Although Ram had proven his loyalty during the Congress split, Indira 
Gandhi very likely perceived his strong base among scheduled castes as a threat.46   
 With her control of the Congress presidency ensured, Gandhi could select one-
half of the members of the Congress Working Committee quite directly.  She also 
exercised great influence over the remaining members, who were elected by the AICC, 
by regulating the selection of candidates.47  With the CWC in her pocket, Gandhi was 
also in effective control over its associated organizations, including the CEC.  She used 
her power over the party’s apex bodies to turn the organization on its head.   
Under Nehru, officials at each level of the Congress organization had derived 
much of their power from the primary membership and from the lower levels of the party 
hierarchy.  By contrast, Prime Minister Gandhi adopted the practice of using the powers 
of the CEC and the Parliamentary Board (another party institution involved in candidate 
selection) to appoint members of Pradesh Congress Committees by fiat.  These members 
would be personally loyal to the prime minister, and would generally not have an 
independent power base that could challenge her in the future.  The centrally-appointed 
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PCCs would in turn often be charged with selecting members of the DCCs who fit the 
same criteria.  PCCs that opposed or threatened her Indira Gandhi would simply dissolve 
and replace with ad hoc bodies that operated under her personal direction.   
In a further sign of the centralization of the party, the Congress president assumed 
the authority to nominate two representatives on every Congress Committee.48  As a 
result, Prime Minister Gandhi was able to place supporters directly at every level of the 
party organization.  Her control over the Congress apparatus was finally complete when 
Gandhi and her Congress president postponed the 1970 party elections and suspended 
those scheduled for 1972.  Indira Gandhi had transformed a party organization that had 
derived its power from the political base into a top-down institution, and she had done it 
without changing the letter of the party constitution.49 
 In addition to expanding her control over the new Congress Party organization, 
Prime Minister Gandhi moved to dominate the process of selecting candidates for the 
Lok Sabha.  As we have already discussed, in Nehru’s time, the Central Election 
Committee had generally allowed bodies at the state level to select candidates, only 
intervening in the decisions of faction-ridden states.  By contrast, Gandhi used the CEC 
to, as Stanley Kochanek put it, “restructure state legislative elites from above.”50  
Through the CEC and the Parliamentary Board, the prime minister appointed and 
removed state chief ministers and members of Pradesh Congress Committees and 
Pradesh Election Committees.  She refused to re-nominate state politicians whom she 
opposed, replacing them with politicians selected for their loyalty to the prime minister 
rather than their base in the state.51  On the eve of her success in the state elections of 
 22
1972, for example, Gandhi forced out the powerful chief ministers of Andhra Pradesh, 
Assam, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan.52   
 Because the Congress Party dominated Indian politics, its centralized structure 
was grafted onto the government.  Without any visible changes in form, the same federal 
and state institutions that had functioned with significant independence under Nehru 
became vassals of the new prime minister.  The increased role of the central government 
and the prime minister vis-à-vis the states is indicated by a decrease in the number of 
voters who, when polled, could name their chief ministers.53  Further, in those states 
where factional conflict prevented the establishment of a stable government, or where 
non-Congress parties held sway, Indira Gandhi often exercised “President’s rule,” 
assuming direct control over state governments.  Nehru and Shastri (Indira Gandhi’s 
immediate predecessor) had resorted to President’s rule only ten times during their 
tenures in office, whereas Indira Gandhi (plus the 1977-80 Janata government) made use 
of it fully seventy-two times.54   
The impact of a centralized Congress on the functioning of government was also 
manifested in Gandhi’s strengthening of the prime minister’s personal secretariat and in 
her constant reshuffling of the cabinet.  Perhaps the most well-known example of this 
approach was the prime minister’s removal of her most senior supporters Y. B. Chavan, 
Jagjivan Ram, Swaran Singh, and F. A. Ahmed from their strong positions in the 
ministries.55   After her confrontation with the Syndicate over the Indian presidency, 
Prime Minister Gandhi also ensured that whoever held that exalted office was clearly 
under her influence.  In 1974, she prevented V. V. Giri from serving a second term, and 
instead appointed her supporter F. A. Ahmed to become President.56 
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Examining the Causal Linkages: 
Did Party Centralization drive Economic Patronage Distribution? 
 
 The centralized character of Indira Gandhi’s Congress helped determine, I argue, 
the allocation of economic benefits in India.  Indira Gandhi, at the apex of the Congress 
“pyramid”, had personal access to extensive sources of patronage, which she distributed 
strategically to build and maintain support from key groups in her unwieldy electoral 
coalition.57  As a result, I argue, economic patronage, including government finance and 
industrial licenses, were less evenly distributed under Gandhi than they had been under 
her father.   
 
Industrial Licensing 
Indira Gandhi’s centralized use of economic patronage was reflected in her 
increased control over industrial licenses.  In 1969, the prime minister leveraged a new 
law, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), into greater powers 
over private industry.  Further, in stark contrast to Nehru, she centered decision-making 
for major industrial license requests in a special cabinet committee, ensuring that each 
application would require her personal approval.   
 Prime Minister Gandhi’s centralized control over the Congress Party allowed her 
to dictate industrial licensing decisions from her office.  She had little fear that lower 
echelons of the party would object to her new powers.  While Nehru had played little role 
in allocating industrial licenses, Indira Gandhi ensured that no major projects could be 
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approved without her personal agreement.  Under the MRTP, a committee of ministerial 
representatives would review the license applications of large business houses.  Any 
proposals that the committee approved it would send to the Ministry of Industrial 
Development, while any questionable or complex proposals it would forward to a semi-
independent Monopolies Commission.58  In reality, however, decision-making had 
become so political that the Commission was often shut out of the process.  In 1972, its 
members complained to the Parliament: 
The Commission cannot help feeling that there is some incongruity in that 
sometimes cases not involving any major issue were referred to the Commission 
while other which would prima facie involve important considerations are not so 
referred.59 
 
From 1970, the ultimate decision-making authority over industrial licenses lay neither 
with the Monopolies Commission nor with the ministries, but with the prime minister and 
her secretariat.  The secretariat had been created by Shastri to strengthen his hand in 
dealing with the party organization, and it was beholden only to the prime minister.60  
Under Indira Gandhi, it took on a new identity as the center of power in the Indian 
government.  As long-time civil servant Nitish Sengupta put it: 
Interestingly, PM’s secretariat became a miniature central secretariat.  Some of 
the Joint Secretaries or even Deputy Secretaries would only deal with the 
Ministers or Secretaries of other departments and would zealously guard their 
authority.  The PM’s secretariat became, for all practical purposes, the most 
important Ministry in the Government of India between 1970 and 1977.  It had 
the power to veto any proposed activity.61 
 
All major applications had to be forwarded to the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Coordination, a body chaired by Gandhi and essentially a part of her office.62  Nitish 
Sengupta wrote: 
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No worthwhile project could be cleared without the prime minister’s approval.  
Those who managed to get industrial licenses also managed to see to it that others 
did not.  This was done by money, influence, and political muscle power.63 
 
Industrial licenses had become, at least in part, an instrument of patronage to be doled out 
by the prime minister to shore up her political position. 
 While Nehru and Shastri had presided over a decentralized system where 
numerous firms and officials bargained over license allocation, Gandhi was able to target 
approvals strategically to build support.64  Gandhi’s centralization of the industrial 
licensing system was reflected in an uneven distribution of approvals across India’s 
federal states.  It was also apparent in the relationship between licensing decisions and 
the Congress Party’s national political interest.   
That licensing decisions were guided by political and strategic considerations 
under Indira Gandhi is indicated in Figure 1.  In this figure, I group India’s federal states 
into three categories – those that gave the Congress Party weak electoral support (less 
that 45% of votes), those that gave it moderate support (between 45% and 55% of votes), 
and those that gave it strong support (over 55% of votes).65   For the earlier period, I 
measure a state’s electoral support for the Congress using its Lok Sabha vote in the 1962 
general election; for the later period, I use the state’s Lok Sabha vote in the 1971 general 
election.66   The blue bars represent the average number of industrial licenses received 
per capita by states in each group in 1965, while the red bars represent the licenses 
received per capita in 1974-75.   
 
Insert Figure 1 
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The results show that the distribution of industrial licenses was more uneven 
during the Indira Gandhi period (represented by the red bars) than during the Nehru 
period67 (represented by the blue bars).68  Moreover, the data indicate that, under Indira 
Gandhi, a state’s relative support for the Congress Party was likely to influence its receipt 
of industrial licenses.  It appears that Prime Minister Gandhi strategically approved more 
licenses to states where support for the Congress was marginal, likely hoping to win them 
over for the next election.69  By contrast, states where Congress support was weak and 
states where it was strong received fewer licenses.  The prime minister likely reasoned 
that changes in patronage allocation would probably not alter the voting behavior of these 
states significantly.70  In other words, the data indicate that, under a centralized Congress, 
industrial licenses were distributed strategically to benefit the national electoral ambitions 
of the party.  By contrast, the data do not support such a clear motivation for licensing 
decisions under a decentralized Congress. 
 
Highlighting Causality:  
Party Centralization and Financial Disbursements  
 
The prime minister’s centralized control of the Congress party also allowed 
significant influence over the distribution of government monies channeled through two 
key institutions – the Planning Commission and the nationalized banks.   
When, in the summer of 1969, Indira Gandhi nationalized India’s fourteen largest 
private banks, she took one of the most far-reaching economic policy decisions of her 
tenure as prime minister.  Most observers attribute the proximate cause of Gandhi’s 
decision to her ongoing feud with the Syndicate; the prime minister calculated correctly 
that bank nationalization would buttress her political support among the Indian masses 
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and the left parties.  Also important, I believe, was the potential for patronage generation 
that centralized control over India’s credit markets could afford. 
With nationalization, representatives of the Congress Party were placed onto the 
governing boards of commercial banks, and non-market criteria made their way into 
allocative decisions.  Because Gandhi exercised highly centralized control over the 
Congress Party, she was able to intervene in investment decisions through these 
representatives.  Gandhi and her associates used this new source of patronage to win the 
backing of Indian industrial and farming interests, providing loans at low interest rates to 
supporters.   
In addition, Indira Gandhi made use of the significant allocative discretion 
enjoyed by the government to leverage some Planning Commission disbursements into 
political capital.  During Gandhi’s tenure as prime minister, distributional decisions under 
the Planning Commission were determined in part by the Gadgil formula.  This formula, 
developed and implemented under the old, decentralized Congress Party, identified a 
series of criteria (for example population and income) to be used when deciding on 
planning outlays to each federal state.71  After centralizing the Congress Party, Gandhi 
continued to adhere to this formula, perhaps because it contained sufficient ambiguities to 
afford her significant control over the recipients of government rupees.  It remained 
largely within the prime minister’s purview, for example, to determine which states 
needed extra federal funds for “special needs” or “special problems.”   
The political targeting of plan transfers under Indira Gandhi is indicated in Figure 
2.  The blue bars show financial disbursements to the states under Nehru’s Second Five 
Year Plan, whereas the red bars show disbursements under Gandhi’s Fourth Five Year 
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Plan.  As expected, transfers under the Second Plan are distributed fairly evenly, 
regardless of a state’s level of support for the Congress Party.  By contrast, transfers 
under the Fourth Plan appear more targeted towards strengthening the party’s position in 
marginal states. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have argued that the organization of the Congress Party has been 
among the most important determinants of economic patronage distribution in India.  
During the Nehru period, the decentralized nature of the Congress Party led to fierce 
bargaining among influential state and local leaders over the allocation of economic 
benefits under the Second Five Year Plan.  The distribution of these benefits was 
determined through a vast national logroll, leading, I contend, to an even distribution of 
licensing and state finance relative to what would come later.  Immediately after the 
party’s dramatic 1969 split, Indira Gandhi centralized the new Congress under her 
personal control.  She strategically distributed patronage to key industries and 
constituencies, eliminating the vast logrolls and complex bargains of the Nehru era.  The 
increasingly uneven distribution of license allocation and government finance during this 
period supports the argument. 
What does the Indian case tell us about the role of political party organization in 
influencing the distribution of economic patronage?  Most other domestic institutions, 
including those highlighted by the literature as determinants of government largess, did 
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not vary enough across the Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras to reasonably explain the 
economic shifts.  The evidence, I believe, indicates clearly that the centralization of the 
Congress Party was the driving force behind the observed changes in patronage 
distribution.  That is not to say that other explanations might not matter in a different 
context; they very likely would.  Rather, it is to emphasize the vital impact that party 
organization can have in determining who gets economic benefits and who is left in the 
cold.  In fact, the importance of party organization in the Indian case provides evidence 
that it is a sufficient, although probably not necessary, condition for shifts in patronage 
distribution.  As such, I believe that the organization of parties should be counted among 
the key political determinants of the economic behavior of democracies. 
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1 See, for example, Evans 1995; Kohli 2004; Wade 1990; Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989. 
2 This fact has been frequently demonstrated.  See, for example, Evans 1995; Kohli 2004; 
Haggard and Webb 1994; Haggard and Kaufmann 1995; Rogowski 1987, and many 
others. 
3 See for example, Busch and Reinhardt 1999, Busch and Reinhardt 2000, and Lopez and 
Pagoulatos 1996. 
4 See, for example, Esty and Caves 1983 and Salamon and Seigfried 1997. 
5 See, for example, Rogowski 1987, Mansfield and Busch 1995, and O’Halloran 1994. 
6 An important exception is McGillivray 2004, who argues that, in majoritarian systems, 
marginal districts will receive greater protection under high party discipline and less 
protection under low discipline. 
7 A variety of different actors may receive government economic support.  In this article, 
I focus on explaining the distribution of patronage to firms and sub-national political 
units, especially federal states.  In the federal hierarchy of India, the case that I consider 
here, there are a number of geographical levels.  From largest to smallest, the most 
important are: (1) the federal government (also called the Centre); (2) the state 
governments (also called Pradesh governments); (3) the district governments (similar to 
US counties); (4) the Mandal governments; and (5) the village governments (sometimes 
governed by panchayats).  In this article, when I refer to national officials, I mean 
authorities from level 1.   Likewise, state officials are authorities from level 2, sub-
national officials from levels 2, 3, 4, and 5, and local officials from levels 3, 4, and 5. 
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8 See, for example, Duverger 1954; Randall and Svasand 2002; Mainwaring and Scully 
1995; Mainwaring 1999; Jin 1995; Janda 1980. 
9 In another paper (Hankla forthcoming), I argue that party centralization, by itself, tends 
toward freer trade (and, by extension, less economic patronage available for government 
distribution).  In that paper, I contend that the centralization of parties shifts power to 
national party leaders with incentives to privilege the national interest in freer trade over 
the demands of protectionist groups.  Nevertheless, I also suggest that unstable or narrow 
party linkages to the electorate could lead even centralized parties to adopt protectionist 
trade policies and make extensive use of economic patronage.  The current paper puts 
these issues aside, however, and seeks to understand the process of economic patronage 
distribution rather than its extent. 
10 For more on most similar systems research designs and the comparative method, see 
Ragin 1987, Przeworski and Teune 1970, King, Keohane and Verba 1992, Meckstroth 
1975, Lijphart 1975, Dion 1998, Hall 2003, and Mahoney 2003. 
11 Indira Gandhi’s rhetoric did shift to the left in the late 1960s, but was never very much 
in opposition to the Congress Party’s socialist tradition. 
12 Detailed descriptions of Congress Party organization are available from Kochanek 
1968, Brass 1965, Sirsikar and Fernandes 1984, Weiner 1967, and Kumar 1990. 
13 Interviews with a senior Congress Party official and an Indian government official, 
New Delhi, September and October 2003. 
14 Weiner 1967. 
15 See Kothari 1964, Manor 1988, Chhibber and Petrocik 1990, Weiner 1967, Rudolph 
and Rudolph 1987, and Brass 1994. 
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16 For descriptions of the candidate nomination process, see Kochanek 1968, Brass 1965, 
Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, Sisson 1972, and Sirsikar and Fernandes 1984. 
17 See Kochanek 1968. 
18 Hanson 1966. 
19 Hanson 1966, p. 61. 
20 Interviews with a senior Congress Party official and an Indian government official, 
New Delhi, September and October 2003; Hanson 1966. 
21 Hanson 1966. 
22 See Hanson 1966. 
23 See Hanson 1966. 
24 Hanson 1966.  A crore is an Indian measure equivalent to 10 million. 
25 Interviews with an Indian government official and a senior Congress Party official, 
New Delhi, September and October 2003; Corbridge and Harriss 2000. 
26For example, the power of state officials is demonstrated by the creation of a steel 
industry in Punjab and Tamil Nadu, states lacking the natural resource endowments 
normally associated with steel production. Interviews with an Indian government official 
and a senior Congress Party official, New Delhi, September and October 2003; Corbridge 
and Harriss 2000. 
27 Hanson 1966. 
28 Indian National Congress 1955, p. 2. 
29 Planning Commission 1963, p. 46-47. 
30 Planning Commission 1963, p. 47. 
31 Hanson 1966. 
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35 Bhagwati and Desai 1970; Srinivasan 1992. 
36 Bhagwati and Desai 1970. 
37 Bhagwati and Desai 1970. 
38 Ninth Report of the Committee on Industrial Licensing, New Delhi, 1967, as quoted in 
Bhagwati and Desai 1970, p. 267. 
39 Ninth Report of the Committee on Industrial Licensing, New Delhi, 1967, as quoted in 
Bhagwati and Desai 1970, p. 267. 
40 See Hanson 1966 
41 In another paper (Hankla 2006), I relate the de-institutionalization of the Congress 
Party to Indira Gandhi’s increasingly tight regulation of the Indian economy. 
42 Mitra 1994; Kochanek 1976; Manor 1992; Kohli 1990; Chhibber 1999; Frankel 1978; 
Rai and Pandy 1971; Singh 1981. 
43 See Mitra and Singh 1999. 
44 Kochanek 1976.  Hereafter, I refer to Indira Gandhi’s branch of the party simply as the 
Congress, following the convention that accords it the name of the original party. 
45 Kochanek 1976. 
46 Kochanek 1976.  The scheduled castes are, in common parlance, the “untouchable” 
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49 Kochanek 1976; Manor 1992. 
50 Kochanek 1976, p. 100. 
51 Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987.  It should be noted that the 
presence of powerful factions at the state level did limit to some degree Indira Gandhi’s 
power.  See Mitra 1994. 
52 Kochanek 1976. 
53 Mitra and Singh 1999. 
54 Chhibber 1999. 
55 Rai and Pandy 1971. 
56 Kochanek 1976. 
57 See Kochanek 1976; Chibber 2003; Duc 1987. 
58 Frankel 1978; Sengupta 1995;  
59 Monopolies Commission, as quoted in Sudhanshu 1986, p. 334. 
60 Frankel 1978. 
61 Sengupta 1995, p. 239. 
62 Frankel 1978; Sengupta 1995. 
63 Sengupta 1995, p. 59. 
64 Interview with an Indian government official, New Delhi, October 2003.   
65 I exclude the state of Jammu and Kashmir from the analysis because the dispute with 
Pakistan and China helped drive very high aid levels from the central government.  I also 
exclude India’s micro-states (i.e. Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Himachal 
Pradesh, and Manipur) because data availability is mixed and because small changes in 
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patronage distributed to these low population states can result in large changes in per 
capita patronage allocation. 
66 This coding scheme means, of course, that a state’s grouping may change from one 
period to the next. 
67 Nehru had actually died in 1964, but the Congress Party in 1965 remained much as he 
had left it. 
68 This finding is especially striking when you consider that only one state (Orissa) can be 
classified as having given the Congress “strong support” in the 1962 election.  As a 
result, the finding that states strongly supportive of the Congress received fewer licenses 
in 1965 may be an anomaly.   
69 This finding is compatible with McGillivray 2004. 
70 The fact that MPs are not elected from states but from districts within states is probably 
causing some error in the results.  In other words, Indira Gandhi may have funneled 
patronage into marginal districts within states that were not marginal.  Still, the data 
presented here indicate, I believe, real differences across the two time periods, and a 
district-level study is beyond the scope of this project. 
71 George 1985. 
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Figure 1: 
 
Industrial License Allocation to the States
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NB:  Only one state was classified as giving the Congress "strong support" for the 1965 data series.  
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Figure 2: 
 
Plan Transfers to the States
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NB:  Only one state was classified as giving the Congress "strong support" for the 1965 data series. 
 
